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THE "SET UP" DEFENSE AND THE COMPARATIVE
FAULT DEFENSE: NEW WRINKLES IN BAD FAITH
CLAIMS AGAINST INSURERS
In 1914 courts first began to recognize that insurance contracts create
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.' If an insurer breaches its
duty of good faith and fair dealing, courts provide insureds an extra-
contractual tort cause of action for bad faith.2 Courts have applied a bad
1. See Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 242, 104 N.E. 622, 624 (1914)
(universal duty of good faith and fair dealing underlies insurance contracts); see also Auto
Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, -, 184 So. 852, 859 (1938) (same); Hilker v.
Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, -, 231 N.W. 257, 259-60 (1930) (same).
2. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 660, 328 P.2d 198,
201-02 (1958) (if insurer, in bad faith, refuses to settle, insurer is liable in tort for excess
judgment against insured); Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 668,
250 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Ct. App. 1952) (insurer's bad faith refusal to settle renders insurer liable
in tort); W. SHoERNOF, INSURANCE BAD FATH LITIGATION § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-3 (1986) (courts
used flexibility of tort law to accomplish desirable social goal of protecting insureds); Halbert,
Insurers Bad Faith Refusal to Settle-Excess Liability Consequences, 57 PA. B.A.Q. 38, 38
(Jan. 1986) (noting courts' recognition that some check on insurers' power to handle claims
was necessary if insurers had absolute authority over settlement); Note, Excess Liability of
Insurers For Bad Faith Refusal to Settle: A Boon to the Individual Insured That Works to
the Detriment of Consumers, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 377, 377-99 (1984) [hereinafter Note,
Excess Liability] (discussing evolution and current status of bad faith claims). Courts originally
allowed insureds to sue their insurers under a cause of action for bad faith failure to settle
because insureds, in their insurance contracts, gave up their right to settle claims against them.
See Southern Fire, 35 Tenn. App. at 668, 250 S.W.2d at 790 (because insured loses right to
settle claims against him by signing insurance contract, insured has right to assume that insurer
will not abandon insured's interest). Insurance policies contractually limit an insurer's liability
to a preset amount. See M. GREN & J. TREsCHMANN, RISK AND INSURANCE 254 (5th ed.
1981) (purpose of insurance policy is to limit insurer's liability contractually). An insurer
ordinarily has exclusive authority to handle claims against its insured, including the right to
make decisions regarding claims settlements. See Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d
858, 870, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 519 (Ct. App. 1973) (insurer has exclusive authority over
settlement); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kornbluth, 28 Colo. App. 194, 199, 471 P.2d 609,
611 (Ct. App. 1970) (insurance policy precludes insured from interfering in settlement nego-
tiations). A typical insurance contract provides that:
[t]he company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property
damage to which this insurance applies . . . and may make such investigation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.
Brittle, Avoiding Insurer's Excess Liability, 28 FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. 298, 299 n.1 (1978). An
insurer that refuses an offer to settle within an insured's policy limit leaves its insured in a
precarious position. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, __ , 426 P.2d 173, 176,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967) (insured is responsible for amount of judgment over insured's
policy limit). If a plaintiff claiming monetary damages against an insured obtains a judgment
against the insured that exceeds the insured's policy limit, the insured is responsible to the
plaintiff for the excess amount. See id. (insured is responsible for amount of judgment over
insured's policy limit); Note, Liability Insurers and Third-Party Claimants: The Limits of
Duty, 48 U. Cm. L. Rav. 125, 126-27 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Liability Insurers] (discussing
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faith cause of action to insurance contracts particularly because courts have
Crisci decision); infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text (same). An insured in a bad faith
action generally attempts to shift liability for an excess judgment to the insurer if the insurer
wrongfully refused to settle within the insured's policy limit. See Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at
660, 328 P.2d at 201 (insurer is liable for entire judgment against insured if insurer, in bad
faith, refuses to settle); Southern Fire, 35 Tenn. App. at 668, 250 S.W.2d at 790 (insurer is
liable in tort for excess judgment because of insurer's bad faith refusal to settle); see also
infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (plaintiffs have strong motivation to shift liability to
insurers because insurers ordinarily have greater financial resources than insureds). Bad faith
claims are now commonplace. See infra note 7 (listing court decisions involving claims of bad
faith). Insurer liability for bad faith refusal to settle, however, is a relatively new cause of
action. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (courts first began to recognize bad faith
claims in 1914).
Courts first examined a cause of action for bad faith around the turn of the century, but
rarely allowed plaintiffs to recover from insurers for bad faith. See, e.g., Rumford Falls Paper
Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574, -, 43 A. 503, 506 (1899) (insurer does not
have to settle all claims against insured); McDonald v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L.
308, 310, 162 A. 620, 620 (1932) (insurer has no obligation to settle claims absent contractual
agreement to settle claims); Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 252, 140 N.E.
577, 579 (1923) (insurer has no duty to settle claims prior to trial); C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing
Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 289, 90 A. 653, 654, (1914) (insurer has no duty to
pay claim before trial). But see New Orleans & C.R.R. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 La.
153, 160, 38 So. 89, 92 (1905) (insurer must exercise good faith and act intelligently in
evaluating settlement offers); Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp., 79 N.H. 186, 187, 106 A. 604, 604 (1919) (insurer is under duty to act as average
person would act in settling claim). In early decisions involving bad faith claims, courts, after
examining the express terms of insurance contracts, generally found that, while insurers had
the option to compromise claims, insurers had no legal obligation to settle claims before trial.
See Auerbach, 236 N.Y. at 252, 140 N.E. at 579 (insurer has no legal duty to settle claims
prior to trial); Schmidt, 244 Pa. at 289, 90 A. at 654 (insurer has no duty to pay claim before
trial). Insurers, therefore, had unfettered discretion to defend or settle claims against their
insureds. See Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Casualty Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 1128, 97 N.W.2d 168,
172 (1959) (language of insurance policy permitted insurer to use its discretion with regard to
settlement); Note, Excess Liability, supra, at 380 (under early bad faith decisions, insurers had
absolute discretion to decide whether to settle third-party claims against insured).
Courts gradually began to recognize that allowing insurers complete discretion regarding
claims settlements created a conflict of interest between insurers and insureds. See Note, Excess
Liability, supra, at 387 (only insurer can profit from refusing to settle claim against insured).
If an insurer had absolute discretion over whether to settle a third-party claim against an
insured, the insurer had a strong incentive to gamble with its insured's money, even if its
insured had only a small chance of a favorable verdict. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.
Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 498, 323.A.2d 495, 508 (1974) (insurer, in attempting
to save its own money, exposes insured to liability for excess judgment). Since an insurer
never could lose more than its insured's policy limit, an insurer whose policy holder had even
a slim chance of a favorable verdict had a strong incentive not to settle. See id. (insurer, by
exposing insured to excess verdict, can attempt to save money). Even if the liability of an
insured appeared certain, an insurer, although expecting to lose the amount of its insured's
policy limit, still might refuse to settle since a jury conceivably could find for the insured. See
Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at __ , 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (insurers, hoping for favorable
verdicts, have strong incentive to gamble with insureds' money). If the insurer's gamble failed,
the insurer would pay the policy limit and force the insured to pay the excess amount of the
judgment. See id. at __, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (insured is responsible for
amount of judgment over insured's policy limit). Since insurers had exclusive authority to
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perceived that insureds have an inferior financial position to and an unequal
bargaining power with insurers.3 Insurers ordinarily have exclusive contrac-
tual authority to handle third parties' claims against insureds, including
authority over settlement, and, as a result, can refuse to settle those claims.
4
Courts have determined that an insurer who wrongfully refuses to settle a
claim against its insured within the insured's policy limit acts in bad faith.
5
By claiming that an insurer has acted in bad faith, an insured can recover
damages for an insurer's wrongful refusal to settle within an insured's policy
limit if the insured becomes liable for an amount in excess of his policy
limit.6
settle claims, courts decided to afford insureds some protection. See, e.g., American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1932) (insurer's duty to insured arises
because insurer assumes all power over settlement through contract), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
736 (1933); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, -, 319 P.2d 69, 71 (Ct.
App. 1958) (courts should protect insured's interests from insurer misconduct); Southern Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 668, 250 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Ct. App. 1952)
(insured, by signing insurance contract, gives his insurer right to settle third-party claims
against insured and, therefore, insured has right to assume that insurer will not abandon
insured's interest); Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 13, 235 N.W. 413, 414
(1931) (insurer's duty to insured arises from insured's assignment of certain rights and privileges
to insurer).
3. See Healy Tibbits Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 72 Cal. App.
3d 741, 749, 140 Cal. Rptr. 375, 382 (Ct. App. 1977) (insurance policies are adhesion contracts);
Dobbyn, Is Good Faith in Insurance Contracts a Two-Way Street, 62 N.D.L. REv. 355, 355
(1986) (comparing courts' protective treatment of insureds with courts' treatment of sailors,
infants, and incompetents). Because insureds have an inferior financial position to and an
unequal bargaining power with insurers, courts perceive insureds as easily disadvantaged and
economically intimidated. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (annual premiums of
insurance industry in 1979 were equivalent to one-eighth of total disposable income for all
Americans).
4. See supra note 2 (discussing typical insurance contract provision that grants authority
over claims settlements to insurer).
5. See Torrez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 1192, 1194 (10th Cir. 1982)
(claimant's estate brought action against tortfeasor's insurer for wrongfully refusing to settle
plaintiff's claim within tortfeasor's policy limit); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d
475, 477 (5th Cir. 1969) (insurer, in bad faith, refused to settle personal injury claims against
insured within insured's policy limits). Courts generically denominate claims that an insured
brings against an insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as "bad faith"
actions because bad faith is the typical standard of conduct that will expose an insurer to
liability. See P. MAGARcic, ExcEss LLimmrry § 10.02, at 164 (2d ed. 1982) (courts in majority
of states hold that bad faith is necessary to find in favor of insured against insurer). Although
the majority of courts considering bad faith claims against insurers require a finding of "bad
faith," some courts have allowed insureds to establish insurers' liability after the insureds
showed that the insurer acted negligently in handling a claim. See infra notes 38-41 and
accompanying text (discussing negligence criterion in certain jurisdictions); see also infra notes
34-37 and accompanying text (defining "bad faith"). Examples of insurer conduct that evidence
bad faith include an insurer's wrongful refusal to pay a claim if the insurer owes the insured
directly under an insurance policy, and the negligent defense of or refusal to defend the insured
in a third-party claim if the insurer has a contractual duty to defend. See LePley, Bad Faith
Updated, 21 TRIAL 44, 44-46 (Apr. 1985) (describing insurer conduct that might support bad
faith claim); supra note 2 (discussing cause of action for bad faith refusal to settle).
6. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 660, 328 P.2d 198, 201
19881
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Although courts uniformly have determined that insureds can recover
damages for bad faith from insurers, 7 courts differ on the standard of proof
necessary to subject insurers to liability.8 Traditionally, courts have placed
a fairly heavy burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate insurers' bad faith. 9
Recent decisions, however, increasingly have reduced insureds' burdens of
proving insurers' bad faith.' 0 To protect themselves from plaintiffs' ex-
panding ability to recover in bad faith claims, insurers increasingly have
attempted to immunize themselves from liability by claiming various de-
fenses." For example, insurers recently have claimed that third-party plain-
tiffs have "set up" insurers for bad faith claims.' 2 Insurers claim that,
because insureds ordinarily use the money recovered from insurers in bad
(1958) (insurer is liable for entire judgment against insured if insurer, in bad faith, refuses
offer of settlement); Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 668, 250
S.W.2d 785, 790 (Ct. App. 1952) (insurer is liable in tort for excess judgment because of bad
faith refusal to settle).
7. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 134 Cal. App. 3d 389,
398, 184 Cal. Rptr. 583, 587 (Ct. App. 1982) (insurer's breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing gives insured cause of action for bad faith); National Emblem Ins. Co. v. Pritchard,
140 Ga. App. 350, 350, 231 S.E.2d 126, 126 (Ct. App. 1976) (same); Openshaw v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 192, -, 484 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1971) (same); Rova Farms Resort, Inc.
v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 482, 323 A.2d 495, 511 (1974) (same); State Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, -, 427 S.W.2d 30, 33 (1968) (same); see also Halbert,
supra note 2, at 38 (every jurisdiction has some form of bad faith claim). But see Martin v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542, 551 (5th Cir. 1971) (to recover in bad faith action under
Mississippi law, insured must show fraud by insurer).
8. See Halbert, supra note 2, at 38-39 (no clear distinction between courts' approaches
to what constitutes bad faith). Compare infra note 34 and accompanying text (listing courts
which hold that insurers' failure to consider insureds' interests equally with insurers' interests
is bad faith) with infra note 35 and accompanying text (listing courts which hold that insurers
may consider their own interests superior to their policy holders' interests).
9. See McDonald v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 308, 310, 162 A. 620, 620
(1932) (unless insurer contractually agrees to settle claims, insurer bas no obligation to settle);
Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 252, 140 N.E. 577, 579 (1923) (insurer
has no duty to settle claims before trial).
10. See, e.g., Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 493, 323 A.2d
495, 505 (1974) (claimant's offer of settlement is not prerequisite to imposing liability on
insurer); State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 432, 427 S.W.2d 30, 34 (1968)
(holding insurer liable for bad faith refusal to settle claim even though claimant never made
firm settlement demand); Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 347, 237
N.W.2d 706, 711 (1976) (whether or not claimant makes settlement demand, insurer has
affirmative duty to seek settlement if settlement is in best interest of insured).
11. See LePIey; supra note 5, at 48-50 (discussing circumstances that might produce
defenses to bad faith claims).
12. See, e.g., Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 240, 636 P.2d 32, 44,
178 Cal. Rptr. 343, 355 (1981) (insurer alleged that plaintiffs attempted to create excess liability
action against insurer); DeLaune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (insurer argued that plaintiff's offer was "set up" for bad faith suit), cert.
denied, 330 So. 2d 16 (1976); Kriz v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 42 Or. App. 339, __ , 600
P.2d 496, 500 (1979) (insurer argued that plaintiff, in making settlement demand, intended to
"set up" insurer for bad faith claim).
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faith actions to satisfy third parties' outstanding judgments against insureds 3
and because insurers usually have much greater financial resources than
insureds,' 4 third-party plaintiffs have strong motivations to "'set up" insurers
for bad faith claims if the plaintiffs' damages are likely to exceed an
insured's personal resources.15 In claiming the "set up" defense, an insurer
must assert that a plaintiff acted in bad faith by making an unreasonable
settlement offer, and that the insurer acted reasonably in refusing the
settlement offer.16 If a court determines that a third-party plaintiff "set
up" the insurer, the plaintiff will not recover any damages in the bad faith
action.' 7 In addition to the "set up" defense, at least one court has allowed
an insurer to claim comparative fault as a defense. 8 In claiming comparative
fault, the insurer must show that the plaintiff's own misconduct was at
least partially responsible for the insurer's failure to settle a claim. 9 Unlike
the "set up" defense, which can serve only as an absolute defense,
20
13. See Note, Excess Liability, supra note 2, at 387 (insured that recovers judgment
against insurer in bad faith action ordinarily uses funds -to discharge debt to claimant).
14. See Los Angeles Times, July 15, 1979, § IV, at 1, col. 5 (annual premiums of
insurance industry in 1979 were equivalent to one-eighth of total disposable income for all
Americans).
15. See Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indemn Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, _ 39
Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1964) (insurer argued that, if court imposed excess liability
under existing circumstances, more plaintiffs would offer to settle for insured's policy limits
if insured was insolvent); P. MAGAwCK, supra note 5, § 11.06[1], at 189 (discussing plaintiffs'
interest in "setting up" insurers).
16. See, e.g., Kivi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 695 F.2d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1983)
(insurer contended that it had no reasonable opportunity to settle claim against its insured
within insured's policy limits); Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir.
1978) (insurer alleged that insurer did not act in bad faith because time period that plaintiff
attached to her offer of settlement was unreasonably short); Ashbrook v. Kowalick, 332 F.
Supp. 77, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (insurer argued that plaintiff's failure expressly to keep his
settlement offer open beyond two-week period was unreasonable as matter of law).
17. See, e.g., Baton v. Transamerica, 584 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1978) (because insurer
reasonably assumed that ten-day time period which plaintiffs attached to their offer was
inapplicable to insurer's evaluation of settlement, insurer did not act negligently or in bad
faith in failing to settle claim); DeLaune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (court upheld dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint because time limit that
plaintiffs attached to offer of settlement was unreasonable under circumstances), cert. denied,
330 So. 2d 16 (1976); Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 477, 424 N.E.2d 645,
649 (App. Ct. 1981) (plaintiffs' complaint adequately did not allege breach of duty by insurer
because plaintiffs alleged no facts to indicate why plaintiffs could not accept insurer's late
offer of settlement).
18. See California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274,
282-83, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (Ct. App. 1985) (comparative fault can constitute at least
partial defense to plaintiff's action against insurer for breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing).
19. Id. at 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 823 (if insured fails to furnish information to insurer,
insured's own conduct has contributed to insured's economic loss or emotional distress).
20. See, e.g., Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co., 392 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Or. 1975)
(despite insurer's argument that plaintiff's offer was unreasonable, court found that insurer's
conduct constituted bad faith and lack of due care toward insured), afj'd, 545 F.2d 686 (9th
1988]
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comparative fault can act as either a partial or an absolute defense by
reducing or eliminating-an insured's damages. 2' The "set up" defense is
more difficult to prove than the comparative fault defense because assertions
of "set up" involve the underlying question of an insurer's good faith or
bad faith.22 Under the comparative fault defense, however, an insurer, even
if guilty of bad faith, can reduce the amount of damages that the insurer
must pay to a plaintiff.23
I. Tim ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF BAD FAITH CLAims AGAINST INSURERS
Although the "set up" and comparative fault defenses may assist
insurers in defending bad faith actions, no court ever had recognized a
cause of action for bad faith under an insurance contract until 1914 when,
in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co.,24 the Court of Appeals for the State
of New York determined that every insurance contract implies a duty of
"good faith and fair dealing." '25 In Brassil, the court considered whether
an insured could recover expenses that an insured incurred during an appeal
of a judgment against him. 26 The insurer in Brassil refused an injured
plaintiff's offer to settle the plaintiff's claim within the insured's policy
limit.27 At trial, the plaintiff received a judgment against the insured that
exceeded the insured's policy limit.28 The insurer in Brassil refused to appeal
the judgment and simply offered to pay the insured his policy limit. 29 The
Brassil court reasoned that the insurer's failure to prosecute an appeal after
Cir. 1976); Ashbrook v. Kowalick, 332 F. Supp. 77, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (despite instruction
that plaintiff's time limitation was unreasonable, jury found that insurer acted in bad faith);
Samson v. Transamerica, 30 Cal. 3d 220, 240, 636 P.2d 32, 46, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343, 357 (1981)
(insurer asserted that insured tried to "set up" insurer for bad faith claim, but court determined
that plaintiffs' settlement offer was reasonable as matter of law).
21. See California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 282-83, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (com-
parative fault of insured can constitute at least partial defense to insured's bad faith claim);
see also infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text (defining and explaining comparative fault
defense); infra note 178 and accompanying text (comparative fault possibly can operate as
absolute defense to bad faith claims).
22. See Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, -, 39
Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1964) (critical test in bad faith claim is insurer's good faith or
bad faith, which courts should determine from circumstances of each case).
23. See Fleming v. Safeco Ins. Co., 160 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36-37, 206 Cal. Rptr. 313,
316 (Ct. App. 1984) (reducing plaintiff's compensatory damages by twenty-six percent, which
represented amount proportional to plaintiff's fault).
24. 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
25. Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 235, 104 N.E. 622, 622 (1914).
26. Id. at 237, 104 N.E. at 623.
27. Id. at 236, 104 N.E. at 622.
28. Id. at 236, 104 N.E. at 623.
29. Id. In Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., an insured employed his own attorney to
appeal an adverse judgment against the insured and eventually secured a reversal of the
judgment. Id. at 236-37, 104 N.E. at 623. The appellate court, however, did grant the plaintiff
a new trial against the insured. Id. at 237, 104 N.E. at 622. No new trial ever occurred, and
the court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff's action. Id.
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the insurer had controlled the insured's defense at trial severely prejudiced
the insured.30 The Brassil court recognized that, while the insurer technically
might have acted in accordance with the insurance contract, the insurer
owed its insured the same universal duty of good faith and fair dealing that
underlies all written contracts. 3' The Brassil court concluded that the insur-
er's failure to pursue an appeal if good grounds for appeal existed violated
the insurer's duty of good faith to its insured.3 2
Since Brassil, courts uniformly have recognized that insurers owe their
insured policy holders a duty of good faith and fair dealing.3 3 Courts,
however, use different standards in determining whether an insurer acted in
good faith and dealt fairly with its insured regarding settlement of a claim.
The majority of courts have determined that, to act in good faith, insurers
considering claims settlements must consider the insured's interests equally
with the interests of the insurers. 34 Other courts, unlike the majority, have
30. Id. at 241, 104 N.E. at 624.
31. Id. at 242, 104 N.E. at 624.
32. Id.
33. See Annotation, Duty of Liability Insurer to Settle or Compromise, 40 A.L.R.2D
168 (Supp. 1980) (listing courts that recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing). While the
Court of Appeals for the State of New York, in Brassil, addressed only the duty of good
faith and fair dealing incumbent upon the insurer, other courts have held that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing is a "two-way street" that extends to both the insured and the
insurer. See Brassil, 210 N.Y. at 242, 104 N.E. at 624; Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712
(1980) (duty of good faith and fair dealing runs from insured to insurer); White v. Unigard
Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, -, 730 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1986) (contract imposes duty of
good faith upon insured and insurer); Modisette v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 77 N.M.
661, -, 427 P.2d 21, 25 (1967) (obligation to deal fairly and honestly applies equally to
insurer and insured).
34. See, e.g., Springer v. Citizens Casualty Co., 246 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1957)
(insurer must be at least as zealous in looking after insured's interest as in looking after
insurer's interest); National Mut. Casualty Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, _9 200 P.2d 407,
411 (1948) (insurer must consider rights of insured at least as much as its own rights); Western
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Fowler, 390 P.2d 602, 606 (Wyo. 1964) (insurer must give equal
consideration to insured's interest); see also 14 M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSUANCE 2D § 51:4,
at 387 (rev. ed. 1982) (same). To determine whether an insurer gave an insured's interests
equal consideration, courts often consider whether an insurer failed to settle a third-party's
claim against an insured even though its insured had a slim chance of success at trial and had
a high probability of an excess verdict. See Ashbrook v. Kowalick, 332 F. Supp. 77, 82 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (insurer is liable for bad faith because insurer knew that insured had no defense to
third-party's claim and that plaintiff's recovery greatly would exceed insured's policy limits);
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, -, 426 P.2d 173, 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18
(1967) (court determined that insurer knew insured probably would be found liable to claimant
and that damages probably greatly would exceed insured's policy limit). Additionally, courts
commonly consider an insurer's failure adequately to investigate claims against its insured,
failure to keep its insured informed of settlement decisions, failure to consider the advice of
counsel, and failure to commence or engage in settlement negotiations. M. RHODES, supra, §§
51:13 to 51:17, at 401-07.
Rather than define insurers' duties by relating insurers' interests to insureds' interests,
other courts require insurers, under the duty of good faith and fair dealing, to consider
1988]
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determined that insurers engaging in claims settlements may place their own
interests above their insured policy holder's interests. 35 Finally, some courts
have determined that insurers must give the insured's interest paramount
consideration to the insurers' interests.3 6 Because courts have no uniform
standard for evaluating bad faith claims against insurers, insurers cannot
determine with accuracy whether refusing to settle a particular claim will
result in liability for bad faith.
37
Rather than attempt the difficult task of defining and applying the
various bad faith standards, a few courts have chosen to use ordinary
negligence principles in determining whether an insurer acted in bad faith.
38
In defining an insurer's negligence, courts inquire into the actions that a
reasonable insurer in a similar situation would have undertaken in consid-
ering a third-party's claim against an insured.3 9 Like determinations of bad
settlement offers without reference to an insured's policy limit. See, e.g., Koopie v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 1973) (modem courts require insurers to evaluate
settlement as if no policy limit existed); Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 71-
72, 237 A.2d 857, 862 (1968) (insurer must treat settlement offer as if insurer had full coverage
for any verdict that plaintiff might recover); Cowden v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 389 Pa.
459, 470-71, 134 A.2d 223, 228 (1957) (insurer must treat claim against insured as if insurer
alone was liable for entire amount).
35. See New Orleans & C.R.R. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 La. 153, -, 38 So.
89, 91-92 (1905) (insurer must act in good faith but insurer has absolute right to decide whether
to settle claims); St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employers' Indemnity Corp., 224 Mo.
App. 221, -, 23 S.W.2d 215, 220 (Ct. App. 1930) (if interests of insurer and insured
conflict, insurer's only duty to insured is express contractual duty).
36. See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, -, 228 S.W.2d 750, 754 (1950)
(if insurer's interests conflict with insured's interests, insurer must sacrifice its own interests
in favor of insured's interests); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C.
286, -, 170 S.E. 346, 348 (1933) (same).
37. See Brittle, supra note 2, at 304 (standards of conduct for insurers demonstrate
confusion in courts).
38. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kornbluth, 28 Colo. App. 194, 199, 471
P.2d 609, 611 (Ct. App. 1970) (in suits for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing,
courts more easily can measure insurer's duty using negligence standard); Dumas v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 488, 56 A.2d 57, 59 (1947) (insurer owes insured duty
of due care); G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex.
Com'n App. 1929) (insurer's duty of due care arises because of insurer's absolute control over
litigation).
39. See Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, -, 56 A.2d 57,
60 (1947) (insurer, in considering settlement offer, must act as reasonable man would have
acted in managing his own affairs). The negligence criterion for bad faith claims evolved
because courts perceived that applying subjective standards to bad faith claims against insurers
created unfair results for insureds. See id. (applying any standard other than objective standard
to bad faith claims against insurers would allow insurers to be unduly venturesome at expense
of insureds). Although most jurisdictions have applied a reasonable man standard to bad faith
claims, a few jurisdictions continue to avoid any objective standard and examine bad faith
claims in terms of the insurer's subjective state of mind. See Awrey v. Progressive Casualty
Co., 728 F.2d 352, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1984) (under Michigan law, insurer consciously must
commit wrongful or dishonest act before insurer can be liable for bad faith), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 250 (1985); Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542, 551 (5th Cir. 1971) (under
Mississippi law, insurer must commit fraud before insurer is liable to insured for bad faith).
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faith, determinations of whether an insurer was negligent require a court
to consider the reasonableness of the insurer's actions under the existing
circumstances. 4° Although some courts have applied negligence standards
instead of bad faith standards to insureds' bad faith actions against insurers,
the results that courts have reached under either standard are virtually
identical because courts in jurisdictions that purportedly use a bad faith
standard often have determined that insurers which act negligently also act
in bad faith.
41
Although courts that use bad faith standards and courts that use
negligence standards normally have reached uniform results in considering
bad faith claims, courts potentially might increase insurers' liability by
40. See, e.g., Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Alaska 1979) (duty of good faith and
fair dealing encompasses obligation of insurer to accept reasonable offers of settlement);
Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal: App. 3d 1, 31, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653, 671 (Ct. App.
1978) (ultimate test of insurer's liability is reasonableness of insurer's decision to reject
settlement offer); Charfipion v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 737, 740 (La. Ct. App.
1977) (determination of bad faith failure to settle depends on facts and circumstances of each
case), writ denied, 354 So. 2d 1050 (1978).
41. See Koenen, Bad Faith and Negligence Approaches to Insurer Excess Liability for
Failing to Settle Third-Party Claims: Problems and Suggestions, 54 DaF. COUNS. J. 179, 185
(Apr. 1987) (differences between bad faith and negligence approaches are illusory). Compare
supra note 34 (listing courts that, under bad faith standard, required insurer to consider
settlement offer as if no policy limit existed) with Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial
Ins. Co., 298 Or. 514, -, 693 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1985) (under negligence standard, insurer
must consider settlement offer as if insurer had no policy limit). The illusory differences
between the bad faith standard and the negligence standard become evident after examining
the consequences of negligence by an insurer in bad faith jurisdictions. At least one court has
determined that an insurer's negligence in failing to settle a third-party's claim against an
insured is per se "bad faith." See Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 298 Or. at -, 693 P.2d
at 1299 (using bad faith standard, insurer was liable to insured for excess judgment because
insurer failed to use due care). Other courts have determined that an insurer's negligence is a
factor that juries should consider in determining whether an insurer acted in bad faith. See,
e.g., Knudsen v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 26 Conn. Supp. 325, -, 222 A.2d 811,
812 (Super. Ct. 1966) (insurer's negligence is factor that relates to insurer's bad faith); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, -, 236 A.2d 269, 271-73 (1967)
(upholding jury instruction which stated that insurer had to be free from negligence as well
as bad faith before jury could find that insurer was not liable); Baker v. Northwestern Nat'l
Casualty Co., 26 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 132 N.W.2d 493, 498 (1965) (extent and character of
insurer's negligence are factors that jury should consider in determining whether insurer acted
in bad faith). A few jurisdictions, however, by defining bad faith in subjective terms, have
determined that evidence of negligence is irrelevant because an insurer actually must have
known that the insurer's conduct was wrongful. See Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 427, 436-37, 285 N.E.2d 849, 852, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-09 (1972) (negligence is
insufficient to render insurer liable for bad faith), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973). The
factors that courts consider in evaluating insurer conduct, however, are similar under either
the bad faith or negligence standard. See Koenen, supra, at 185 (evidentiary factors that courts
consider under bad faith and negligence standards are nearly identical). As a result, the
outcomes in applying both standards are fairly uniform. See id. (because evidentiary factors
that courts consider under bad faith and negligence standards are nearly identical, results
under each standard are consistent).
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adopting a strict liability standard in bad faith actions against insurers. 42
Although no court expressly has held an insurer liable using a strict liability
standard,4 the Supreme Court for the State of California, in Crisci v.
Security Insurance Co.,44 suggested that strict liability effectively might
balance the interests of both insurers and insurance policy holders during
settlement procedures.4 5 In Crisci, the California Supreme Court considered
whether, after an insurer refused an offer of settlement within an insured's
policy limit, the insured could recover an excess judgment from her insurer.4
In Crisci, an insurer refused a plaintiff's offer to settle within the insured's
policy limits after the plaintiff, a tenant of the insured, fell through a
negligently maintained staircase.4 7 After the plaintiff recovered damages
from the insured, the trial court allowed the insured to recover the amount
of the judgment that exceeded the insured's policy limits from her insurer.
48
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Crisci court did not
formally recognize that insurers should be strictly liable for bad faith, but
the court favorably discussed the possible application of strict liability to
bad faith claims. 49 The Crisci court explained that the strict liability rule
which the court had advocated in dicta would make an insurer liable
whenever a plaintiff recovered an excess judgment from an insured following
an insurer's refusal to settle within an insured's policy limits.50 The Crisci
42. See Note, Excess Liability, supra note 2, at 379 (insurers' duty to settle is approaching
strict liability).
43. See id. at 385 (no court expressly has held that insurer is strictly liable to party
claiming that insurer acted in bad faith).
44. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
45. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 17 (1967); see Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 496,
323 A.2d 495, 509-10 (1974) (advocating strict liability for insurers in bad faith claims).
46. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at -, 426 P.2d at 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
47. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 13. The plaintiff in Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co. developed a severe psychosis following her accident. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at
175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Mrs. Crisci had a $10,000 liability policy with her insurer, and the
plaintiff offered to settle for $10,000. Id. The insurer knew that the injured plaintiff had
experts who would testify that the plaintiff's mental illness was a result of the accident. Id.
Additionally, the insurer knew that, if the jury believed the plaintiff's expert testimony,
damages would be at least $100,000. Id. The insurer in Crisci, however, found its own experts
who were willing to testify that the accident had not caused the plaintiff's mental illness. Id.
The insurer hoped that the jury would disbelieve the plaintiff's evidence and believe the
insurer's expert testimony. Id. After the insurer refused to settle, the plaintiff recovered a
$101,000 judgment at trial. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. The plaintiff's
attempts to collect the excess judgment from Mrs. Crisci left the insured insolvent, physically
ill, and suicidal. Id.
48. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 13. In Crisci, the trial court, in
addition to determining that the insured could recover the amount of the judgment in excess
of her policy limit, ruled that Mrs. Crisci could recover damages for her emotional suffering.
Id. The insurer appealed the Superior Court's decision to the Supreme Court for the State of
California. Id.
49. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
50. Id.
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court reasoned that courts easily could apply a strict liability standard to
bad faith claims because the use of a strict liability standard would eliminate
the danger that insurers, hoping for favorable verdicts, might gamble with
their insureds' money.5 The California court noted that, because insurers
conceivably might profit from refusing to settle claims, insurers should face
potential liability if they fail to settle.52 Following the Crisci court's dicta,
several courts have raised the standard of conduct that insurers must satisfy
in settling claims to a level that resembles a strict liability standard." The
courts that have raised an insurer's standard of conduct, however, have
failed to recognize that, because a strict liability standard would force
insurers to pay any settlement offer within an insured's policy limits,
regardless of whether a settlement offer was unreasonable, the costs of
insurers' attempts to maintain business would increase substantially under
a strict liability standard. 4 If more courts attempted to adopt the standard
that the Crisci court advocated, insurers undoubtedly would pass the in-
creased costs of doing business to consumers by increasing the costs of
insurance premiums.55 Many commentators feel that imposing strict liability
on insurers would be detrimental to consumers, whose interests the courts
consistently have tried to protect.
5 6
Although recognizing a strict liability standard in insurer bad faith
actions substantially would increase the costs that ingureds would have to
pay for insurance, several courts that have adopted standards similar to
strict liability do not require that a plaintiff make a firm offer of settlement
as a prerequisite to maintaining an insurer's liability.5 7 Because these courts
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 493,
323 A.2d 495, 505 (1974) (claimant's offer of settlement is not prerequisite to imposing liability
on insurer); State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 432, 427 S.W.2d 30, 34 (1968)
(holding insurer liable for bad faith refusal to settle claim even though claimant never made
firm settlement demand); Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 348-49, 237
N.W.2d 706, 711 (1976) (whether or not claimant makes settlement demand, insurer has
affirmative duty to seek settlement if settlement is in best interest of insured).
54. See Note, Excess Liability, supra note 2, at 397 (insurers' costs would rise if courts
raised requisite standard of insurer conduct because insurers, to reduce excess liability exposure,
would have to settle more claims).
55. Id. at 396 (insurers are likely to increase rates to offset large bad faith recoveries
and increased number of settlements).
56. See, e.g., Brittle, supra note 2, at 308-09 (if courts impose strict liability on insurers
in bad faith claims, costs of insurance will increase because insurers will bear same risk
regardless of size of policy); Dobbyn, supra note 3, at 366 (because public relies on insurance
at affordable rates, strict liability is detrimental to interests of public); Note, Excess Liability,
supra note 2, at 379 (insurers are likely to increase premiums as duty to settle approaches
strict liability, which will injure consumers in general).
57. See, e.g., Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 493,
323 A.2d 495, 505 (1974) (claimant's offer of settlement is not prerequisite to imposing liability
on insurer); State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 432, 427 S.W.2d 30, 34 (1968)
(holding insurer liable for bad faith refusal to settle claim even though claimant never made
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do not require firm offers of settlement, insurers safely cannot wait for
plaintiffs to make settlement offers.58 Under decisions of these courts,
insurers have an affirmative duty actively to pursue settlement if settlement
is in the best interest of an insured. 9 By placing an affirmative duty to
settle upon insurers, courts effectively shift the burden of proof in bad faith
actions to insurers, allowing insurers to escape liability only if insurers can
demonstrate that no reasonable possibility of settling within the policy limit
existed and that a settlement above the policy limit, with the insured
contributing the excess, was unlikely 0 The heightening of the bad faith
standard and the trend toward strict liability gravely concerns insurers and
the insurance defense bar.
61
II. INSURERS' DEFENSES To BAD FAITH CLAIMs
In response to concerns regarding strict liability, insurers increasingly
have attempted to immunize themselves from liability under bad faith
claims.6 2 For example, insurers have attempted to prevent bad faith claims
by examining conduct that courts have determined violates an insurer's duty
to its insured and establishing firm policies for handling claims. 63 In addition
firm settlement demand); Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 348-49, 237
N.W.2d 706, 711 (1976) (whether or not claimant makes settlement demand, insurer has
affirmative duty to seek settlement if settlement is in best interest of insured).
58. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 493, 323
A.2d 495, 507 (1974) (insurer has positive fiduciary duty to take initiative and attempt to
achieve settlement).
59. See id. (insurer has positive duty to attempt to achieve settlement); Alt v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 348-49, 237 N.W.2d 706, 712 (same).
60. See Rova, 65 N.J. at 496, 323 A.2d at 507 (insurer, to establish lack of bad faith,
must demonstrate that no reasonable possibility of settlement existed and that settlement above
policy limit was unlikely).
61. See Ashley, Guidelines for the Insurer in Avoiding Bad Faith Exposure, 36 FED'N
OF INS. & CORP. COuNS. Q. 103, 103-20 (Wtr. 1986) (discussing conduct that insurance
practitioners and adjusters should avoid); Brittle, supra note 2, at 310-26 (same).
62. See supra note 61 (listing articles that help insurers to avoid bad faith claims).
63. See Ashley, supra note 61, at 103-18 (instructing insurers how to avoid bad faith
exposure). One commentator has developed specific guidelines for insurers to follow in
attempting to reduce the likelihood that plaintiffs successfully could maintain bad faith actions
against the insurers. Id. The commentator has argued that, because courts consider certain
factors in evaluating bad faith claims, insurers, by addressing those factors before third-parties
file a claim against insureds, can reduce the likelihood that a court will find bad faith. Id. at
103. First, the commentator has advised insurers cautiously to determine whether to defend a
particular claim against an insured. Id. at 103-05. Second, the commentator has advised
insurers fully and fairly to investigate claims against their insureds. Id. at 105-06. The
commentator also has noted that insurers should respond fully, accurately, and in a timely
fashion to demands or inquiries from insureds. Id. at 106-07. Additionally, insurers should
avoid making statements or taking actions that courts may view as tortious or unfair toward
insureds. Id. at 107-08. The commentator has advised insurers to settle and evaluate claims
earlier rather than later. Id. at 108-09. According to the commentator, insurers also should
adopt reasonable settlement positions based on appropriate considerations. Id. at 109-12.
Insurers should keep insureds informed about claims against the insureds. Id. at 112. Insurers
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to adopting preventive measures to reduce the likelihood that a plaintiff
successfully can maintain an action for bad faith, many insurers have begun
to seek possible defenses to bad faith actions.64 Because bad faith claims
involve an inquiry into the reasonableness of circumstances, however, the
development of novel defenses to liability for bad faith claims has been
difficult.6 1 Since claims of bad faith normally depend on specific factual
disputes, a majority of courts continually require that questions regarding
bad faith claims go to juries.6 6 These courts, however, have allowed insurers
to assert certain affirmative defenses under specific circumstances.6 7 For
example, some courts have determined that the assertion by an insurer that
both insurer and insured have acted in a certain manner loosely constitutes
a "defense" to a bad faith action.6 8 As a result, inappropriate conduct by
also should exercise care in recognizing and resolving coverage problems with insureds. Id. at
113-16. Insurers should avoid conflict of interest situations. Id. at 116-17. Finally, the
commentator advises insurers to avoid creating a potential bad faith situation in underwriting
or marketing an insurance policy. Id. at 117-18.
64. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing possible defenses to bad faith
claims).
65. See Ashley, supra note 61, at 103 (insurers cannot insulate themselves entirely from
bad faith liability).
66. See, e.g., Jones v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (D. Mich.
1977) (insurer's bad faith in handling settlement negotiations normally is question for jury);
Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980) (question of insurer's
failure to act in good faith in handling claim against insured is for jury), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 922 (1981); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Schropp, 222 Kan. 612, -, 567 P.2d 1359, 1366
(1977) (whether insurer was negligent or acted in bad faith in refusing offer of settlement is
question for trier of fact). Although an insurer's bad faith ordinarily is a jury question, a
minority of courts have determined that an insurer's conduct was reasonable or unreasonable
as a matter of law. See Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 243, 636 P.2d 32,
45, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343, 357 (1981) (affirming summary judgment ruling for plaintiffs because
plaintiffs' settlement offer was reasonable as matter of law); Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98
Ill. App. 3d 472, 477, 424 N.E.2d 645, 649 (App. Ct. 1981) (upholding dismissal of plaintiffs'
complaint because complaint failed to allege reason that plaintiffs could not accept insurer's
dilatory offer of settlement for amount equal to policy limits).
67. See J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE § 8.27[3], at 8-192 (2d ed. 1987) (at
common law, affirmative defense concedes apparent right in opposite party and relies on some
new matter by which defendant defeats that apparent right).
68. See Maroney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Wis. 2d 197, -, 107 N.W.2d 261, 263
(1961) (insured's refusal to contribute amount in excess of policy limits toward settlement
implied insured's agreement to try suit). In defending a bad faith claim, an insurer plausibly
can argue that the insurer should not be liable for bad faith after failing to settle a third-
party's claim against an insured if the insured, like the insurer, refused to settle the claim. An
insurer can claim this defense if an insured refuses to contribute to a settlement in excess of
the insured's policy limits. See, e.g., Royal Transit v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d
345, 347 (7th Cir. 1948) (insurer does not act in bad faith if insured agrees to refuse settlement
offer), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 844 (1948); Hadenfeldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195
Neb. 578, -, 239 N.W.2d 499, 503 (1976) (sustaining insurer's demurrer because insured
refused to contribute amount in excess of limits toward settlement after insurer offered policy
limits); Maroney, 12 Wis. 2d at - , 107 N.W.2d at 263 (insured's refusal to contribute
amount in excess of policy limits toward settlement implied insured's agreement to try suit).
Similarly, an insured's active concurrence or ratification of its insurer's decision to reject a
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an insured may give an insurer a valid defense to a bad faith claim. 69
settlement offer or try a particular case can foreclose an insured's bad faith claim against its
insurer. See, e.g., Jackson v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 339 F.2d 40, 44 (6th Cir. 1964)
(insured cannot recover from insurer if insured actively concurs in rejection of compromise
offer); Stevens v. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co., 305 F.2d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 1962) (insurer
is not liable because insured agreed with insurer's decision to try case), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
812 (1963); Royal Transit v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1948)
(insurer cannot be liable for bad faith if insured agreed to or joined in insurer's refusal to
settle), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 844 (1948).
Another possible defense that an insurer can use against a bad faith claim is that an
insured failed to purchase insurance coverage that was adequate to protect the insured's
interests. See P. MAGARICK, supra note 5, § 12.0211], at 223 (insured's failure to protect
himself probably is most neglected element in bad faith decisions). Especially if an insured is
a business, an insured's failure to anticipate and secure the proper level of insurance coverage
necessary to protect the insured's interests could operate to mitigate an insurer's failure to
settle a claim. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 325 F. Supp. 204, 206
(W.D.N.C. 1971) (insured, as responsible business firm, should have known that it could
obtain more coverage by requesting increased coverage and paying higher premiums).
In addition to the insured's failure to request more insurance coverage, an insured's failure
to take other affirmative action sometimes can constitute an insurer's defense to a bad faith
claim. See Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, -, 250 S.W.2d
785, 792 (Ct. App. 1952) (plaintiff's failure to mitigate his damages by contributing toward
settlement would be valid defense if plaintiff was able to contribute towards settlement). At
least one court has suggested that an insured, to mitigate damages in his action against an
insurer and to protect his own interests, may have a duty to settle a third-party plaintiff's
claim in excess of his policy limits. See id. (plaintiff may have duty to settle claim in excess
of plaintiff's policy limit). Most courts, however, do not allow insurers successfully to assert
as a defense to a bad faith claim that an insured had a duty to mitigate his damages. See
Noshey v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808, 810 (6th Cir. 1934) (if insurance policy provision
forbids insured from settling case, insured is under no duty to imperil his protection under
contract by breaching contract); Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375, -, 118
N.W.2d 318, 321 (1962) (insured has no duty to attempt to mitigate his excess liability).
Although courts generally do not allow insurers to claim that insureds had to mitigate
damages, some courts have permitted evidence of an insurer's past good faith and fair dealing
to establish a presumption that an insurer acted in good faith in refusing a third-party's
settlement offer. See, e.g., Douglas v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, -, 127 A.
708, 712 (1924) (insurer demonstrated that insurer settled great majority of claims that it
handled); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, -, I A.2d 817, 822 (1938)
(insurer showed that its established policy was to settle claims rather than risk excess liability);
Berk v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597, -, 15 N.W.2d 834, 839 (1944) (insurer
argued that no plaintiff ever had brought excess liability claim against insurer or charged
insurer with bad faith). As a result, evidence of an insurer's prior history may constitute a
defense to an insured's bad faith claim. For example, an insurer which demonstrates that its
established corporate policies have favored fair dealing in considering settlement offers, or
that no insured has succeeded in a bad faith claim against the insurer, may be in a more
favorable position with both the jury and the court than an insurer which offers no evidence
of its corporate policies. See supra note 66 (courts ordinarily send bad faith claims to jury).
Courts that permit an insurer to show that its established corporate policies have favored fair
dealing in considering settlement offers, however, usually allow plaintiffs to offer rebutting
evidence that demonstrates an insurer's past practice of bad faith. See Moore v. American
United Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal. App. 3d 610, 637, 197 Cal. Rptr. 878, 884 (Ct. App. 1984)
(pattern of insurer's unfair claims practices are relevant to justify punitive damages); Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 785, 792, 647 P.2d 86, 90, 183 Cal.
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Additionally, courts have recognized that improper conduct by a third-party
Rptr. 810, 814 (1982) (other instances of unfair settlement practices are highly relevant to
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages).
Another defense to a bad faith claim arises if an insurer bases its decision not to settle
on misrepresentations or wrongful acts by its insured. See, e.g., Hall v. Preferred Accident
Ins. Co., 204 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1953) (insurance contract entitles insurer to honest
statement by its insured); Williams v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 131 F.2d 601, 603 (5th
Cir. 1942) (if insured fails to cooperate with insurer, insurer is not liable in damages); Home
Indem. Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 1948) (same). Courts
ordinarily allow an insurer to rely on information that its insured supplies concerning a claim,
so an insured's misrepresentation or bad faith in supplying information usually negates an
insurer's liability. See Younger v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 174 So. 2d 672, 678-79
(La. Ct. App. 1965) (if insured induces rejection of settlement, insured later cannot sue insurer
for rejecting settlement); see also infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text (discussing
comparative fault and possibility of apportioning relative blame). But see Klingman v. Nat'l
Indem. Co., 317 F.2d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 1963) (to act in good faith, insurer might have to
disbelieve information that insured supplies).
Another possible bar to a bad faith action is an insurer's final settlement of an excess
judgment. See Kricar, Inc. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 542 F.2d 1135,
1136 (9th Cir. 1976) (insurer did not act in bad faith if insurer settled claim against insured).
Even if a settlement occurs after a claimant obtained an excess judgment and after an insured
filed his claim against his insurer, the elimination of the excess judgment normally eliminates
the bad faith action. See id. (insurer's subsequent satisfaction of judgment negated any finding
of bad faith). Because an insured normally cannot receive any consequential damages unless
compensatory damages exist, a settlement of an excess judgment vitiates an insured's claim
for consequential damages. See id. (insured cannot recover consequential damages if insured
suffered no compensatory damages).
Although an insured's refusal to settle or an insured's concurrence in an insurer's decision
not to settle may constitute defenses to a suit that an insured brings against his insurer, more
outrageous conduct by an insured also can comprise a defense to a bad faith claim. For
example, an insurer can argue that its insured, colluding with a third party, attempted to hold
the insurer liable for the third-party's claim against the insured. See State Auto Ins. Co. v.
York, 104 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1939) (collusion occurs if members of family conspire to
secure unjustified recovery from insurer), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 591 (1939); Wakefield v.
Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, -, 225 N.W. 643, 645 (1929) (insurer does not act in
bad faith if insured and claimant conspire to hold insurer liable for bad faith). Additionally,
an insurer can argue that its insured failed to cooperate in settling a third-party's claim against
its insured. See, e.g., Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 101 F.2d 987, 989 (8th
Cir. 1939) (insured's failure to cooperate justified insurer's withdrawal from case); Buffalo v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 84 F.2d 883, 884 (10th Cir. 1936) (insured's breach of
cooperation clause in insurance contract negated insurer's liability); Ohrbach v. Preferred
Accident Ins. Co., 227 A.D. 311, 312, 237 N.Y.S. 494, 496 (App. Div. 1929) (under cooperation
clause, insured did not give full support to insurer). The duty of good faith and fair dealing
is incumbent upon insureds as well as insurers. See, e.g., Commercial Union Assurance Cos.
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712
(1980) (duty of good faith and fair dealing runs from insured to insurer); White v. Unigard
Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, -, 730 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1986) (contract imposes duty of
good faith upon insured and insurer); Modisette v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 77 N.M.
661, -, 427 P.2d 21, 25 (1967) (obligation to deal fairly and honestly applies equally to
insurer and insured). An insured, therefore, owes its insurer a reciprocal duty of good faith
and fair dealing. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (insured owes insurer reciprocal
duty of good faith and fair dealing). An insured's failure to cooperate with an insurer also
can arise as a defense to a bad faith claim because insurance policies consistently contain
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plaintiff can provide an insurer with a defense to a bad faith claim. 70
A. The "Set Up" Defense
A third-party plaintiff's conduct can comprise a defense to a bad faith
claim if a third-party plaintiff would receive substantial benefits from the
bad faith action.71 Because insureds generally have weaker financial positions
clauses requiring insureds to cooperate with insurers in handling claims. See J. McCAtHY,
Ptmrrvw D. nAs iN BAD FAiTH CASES § 1.23, at 72 (4th ed. 1987) (insurance policies
commonly provide that insureds must cooperate with insurers). An example of an insured's
failure to cooperate that can nullify an insurer's liability for refusal to settle is an insured's
failure to disclose certain information to an insurer. See Hall, 204 F.2d at 846 (insured's
failure to supply truthful information to insurer concerning insured's conduct precluded
insurer's bad faith). Although courts generally recognize an insured's duty to cooperate, courts
inconsistently define this general duty to cooperate. See P. MAGARICK, supra note 5, § 12.02[l],
at 223 (person should not assume that he can tell what constitutes insured's refusal to
cooperate).
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing conduct by insured that might
provide insurer with defense to bad faith claim).
70. See id. (insurer does not act in bad faith if insured and claimant conspire to hold
insurer liable for bad faith).
71. See Note, Excess Liability, supra note 2, at 387 (insured that recovers judgment
against insurer in bad faith action ordinarily uses funds to discharge debt to third-party
plaintiff). An insured that successfully prosecutes a bad faith claim against an insurer ordinarily
recovers damages equivalent to the excess judgment. See, e.g., Moutsopoulos v. American
Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1979) (amount of judgment in excess of policy
limit is measure of insurer's liability); McNulty v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 221 So. 2d 208,
210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (same); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427,
437, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 609, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854 (1972) (same), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931
(1973). An insured subsequently uses the money that he recovered as damages in his bad faith
action to satisfy the third-party plaintiff's outstanding judgment. See Note, Excess Liability,
supra note 2, at 387 (insured recovers judgment from insurer and then pays claimant).
Moreover, a rapidly emerging trend allows third-party claimants to proceed directly against
insurers. See Note, Liability Insurers, supra note 2, at 140-52 (discussing judicial attempts to
create direct actions for third-party plaintiffs in bad faith claims). An injured party may pursue
a bad faith claim directly against an insurer in one of three different ways. First, a claimant,
after an insured assigns his rights against an insurer to the claimant, may bring suit against
the insurer in a derivative action. Id. at 125 (claimant may proceed against insurer as insured's
assignee). Second, claimants sometimes can sue insurers in an independent private action under
state unfair business practices acts. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d
880, 889, 592 P.2d 329, 332-34, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (1979) (third-party claimant may sue
insurer for bad faith refusal to settle under state unfair practices act); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney
Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 255-58 (W. Va. 1981) (recognizing implied private right of
action for insurer's bad faith under state statute). But see Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 322
N.W.2d 35, 43 (Iowa 1982) (state statute prohibiting insurers from engaging in unfair or
deceptive business practices does not create private right of action for individual entitled to
insurance proceeds); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 86 A.D.2d 315, 317-
18, 449 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (1982) (no private cause of action for insurer's bad faith exists
under state unfair claims practices statute). See generally Mecherle & Overton, A New Extra
Contractual Cloud Upon the Horizon: Do the Unfair Claim Settlement Practice Acts Create
a Private Cause of Action?, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 262, 262-68 (1983) (discussing whether state
statutes create private bad faith causes of action). Finally, claimants in jurisdictions in which
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than insurers, third-party plaintiffs have strong incentives to prosecute bad
faith claims against insurers.7 2 Even if an insurer successfully defends a bad
faith action, an insured remains liable to a third-party plaintiff for any
judgment against the insured.73 The liability of an insured, however, does
not eliminate a third-party plaintiff's interest in a bad faith claim against
an insurer.7 4 The worth of a judgment depends upon a-plaintiff's ability to
convert the judgment into money. 75 Because insurers typically have greater
assets than insureds, 6 plaintiffs that have large judgments against insolvent
insureds often attempt to use bad faith claims to recover damages from
insurers.
7 7
Because third-party plaintiffs have an inherent motivation to "set up"
insurers for excess judgments, insurers, claiming a "set up" defense, have
attempted to show that unreasonable conduct by a claimant prevented the
insurer from accepting a settlement offer within an insured's policy limits.
78
Although courts roundly condemn plaintiffs' attempts to "set up" insurers, 79
courts have chosen to allow independent suits may bring suit pursuant to a judicially fashioned
independent right of action. See Note, Liability Insurers, supra note 2, at 140 (courts
increasingly are willing to provide claimants with direct means of recovery); Note, Excess
Liability, supra note 2, at 387 (minority of courts recognize right of third party to proceed
directly against insurer). Regardless of who pursues a bad faith claim, the injured claimant is
the real party in interest. See Note, Liability Insurers, supra note 2, at 140 (third-party claimant
is intended beneficiary of bad faith actions).
72. See Note, Excess Liability, supra note 2, at 387 (courts recognized right of third
parties to proceed directly against insurers because third parties may not be able to recover
from insureds).
73. See Halbert, supra note 2, at 38 (insured is liable for difference between amount of
judgment and insured's policy limits).
74. See Note, Excess Liability, supra note 2, at 387 (because insured may file for
bankruptcy or fail to pursue bad faith claim against insurer, claimants want to recover from
insurer).
75. See S. SHERwiN, DaaroRs' A CREDrrORs': RiAs AND Rn Dm~s 16 (1969) (mere
fact that plaintiff obtains judgment does not mean that plaintiff will receive any money).
76. See W. SHERNo , supra note 2, § 1.01, at 1-1 to -2 (discussing unequal bargaining
position between insurer and insured); see also Shernoff, Insurance Company Bad Faith Law,
17 Tmai. 22, 23 (May 1981) (Americans annually pay almost as much for insurance coverage
as for individual income taxes).
77. See Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 696, 319 P.2d 69, 77 (Ct.
App. 1957) (discussing insurer's argument that, by imposing excess liability on insurer, courts
would cause injured claimants that have large judgments against insolvent insureds to propose
settlement within policy limits).
78. See Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, _ 41 Cal. Rptr. 401,
406 (Ct. App. 1964) (insurer argued that one-week time limit that plaintiff placed on settlement
offer was unreasonable).
79. See, e.g., Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1978) (no
Oregon case permits plaintiffs to "set up" insurers); Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co., 392
F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Or. 1975) (cautioning that plaintiff's attorney cannot "set up" insurer);
DeLaune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (plaintiff's
refusal to accept insurer's tender of amount equal to policy limits shortly after time limit on
offer of settlement expired may have been part of charade to "set up" insurer for excess
judgment); see also infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text (discussing Grumbling court's
dicta against "setting up" insurers).
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few courts have considered the viability of a "set up" attempt by the
plaintiff as an insurer's defense to a bad faith action. 0 In asserting the
"set up" defense, an insurer must argue that, because the claimant's
settlement offer was unreasonable, the insurer's failure to accept the offer
was reasonable.8 1 Because a plaintiff normally must make a settlement
demand before he can file a bad faith claim,8 2 most insurers claiming that
plaintiffs have set them up have complained that a plaintiff placed an
unreasonable time limit on the settlement demand." Typically, a plaintiff
will make a settlement offer within the insured's policy limits and state that
the offer will expire at a specified time. 4 If the insurer fails to accept the
plaintiff's offer within the time limit, the plaintiff withdraws the offer.8 5
After withdrawing the offer, the plaintiff is in a position to assert a bad
faith claim.8 6 Attorneys that represent plaintiffs in bad faith claims advocate
placing a time limit on all settlement offers,87 and courts have recognized
that plaintiffs have a right to limit their offers in this fashion.8 8
80. See McNally v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 83-865-WKS, mem. op. at 3 (D. Del. Feb.
15, 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 815 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1987). In McNally v. Nationwide
Insurance Co., the United States District Court for the District of Delaware considered whether
an insurer's allegation that a plaintiff's attorney intended to "set up" the insurer for an excess
judgment was a valid ground for the insurer's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. Id.
The McNally court determined that nothing in public policy or existing law requires a court
to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint if the plaintiff's counsel intended to "set up" an insurer.
Id. The McNally court observed that, for an insurer to be liable, an insurer would have to
breach its duty to its insured by rejecting settlement. Id.
81. See id. (insurer argued that, because one-week time limit in plaintiff's offer was
unreasonable, insurer's failure to accept plaintiff's offer was reasonable).
82. See, e.g., Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1978)
(plaintiffs settlement demand is prerequisite to bad faith action); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co.,
34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 877, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 523-24 (Ct. App. 1973) (same); Ranger Ins.
Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (complaint in
bad faith action ordinarily must include allegation that plaintiff offered to settle claim).
83. See, e.g., Kivi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 695 F.2d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1983)
(insured alleged that claimant's settlement demand, which remained open for thirty-day period,
was unreasonable); Coe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 981, 987, 136
Cdl. Rptr. 331, 333 (Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff's offer of settlement imposed eleven-day deadline
for acceptance); Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 474, 424 N.E.2d 645, 647
(App. Ct. 1981) (plaintiff's demand letter set twenty-eight day deadline).
84. See, e.g., Ashbrook v. Kowalick, 332 F. Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (plaintiff's
offer stated that insurer should consider offer withdrawn unless insurer accepted offer within
two weeks of offer's receipt); Phelan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d
96, 98, 448 N.E.2d 579, 580 (App. Ct. 1983) (plaintiff's offer of settlement stated that plaintiff
no longer would accept policy limits after specified date); Kriz v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 600 P.2d 496, 498 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (plaintiff's offer declared that plaintiff would
withdraw offer of settlement after ten-day period).
85. See Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co., 392 F. Supp. 717, 718 (D. Or. 1975) (plaintiff's
attorney withdrew offer of settlement after expiration of plaintiff's self-imposed time limit).
86. See Note, Liability Insurers, supra note 2, at 132 (if insurer does not accept offer
of settlement within insured's policy limits before plaintiff's deadline, preliminary elements of
bad faith action exist).
87. See Kinerk, Laying the Foundation for a Bad Faith Action, 18 TUAI 50, 50-51 (Dec.
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Because courts recognize plaintiffs' right to place time limits on their
settlement offers, the "set up" defense's viability as a useful defense for
insurers is doubtful. Settlement offers containing a time limit are valid
offers that an insurer must consider. 9 Failure to settle within a specified
time limit can constitute bad faith.90 Failure to accept an offer, however,
will not constitute bad faith if the time limitation that the plaintiff imposed
was unreasonable. 9 The "set up" defense requires a court to determine
whether the plaintiff's conduct was so unreasonable that the conduct made
the insurer's failure to settle reasonable. 92 Because the reasonableness of the
insurer's conduct is still the key issue, the "set up" defense does not alter
the standard bad faith claim.93 Assertions that a claimant "set up" an
insurer are simply evidence for the jury to consider in determining whether
an insurer's failure to settle was reasonable.-
1982) (plaintiff's letter demanding settlement of bad faith claim should state time limit within
which insurer must accept offer of settlement).
88. See, e.g., Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1978) (under
Oregon law, insurer may be liable for failing to accept settlement offer within reasonable time
limits); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, __, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406
(Ct. App. 1964) (plaintiff had right to attach time limit to her offer); Martin v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, -, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (CL App. 1964)
(same). Persons in the insurance trade generally refer to a settlement offer on which a plaintiff
places a deadline as a "plaintiff's bad faith letter." See Kivi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
695 F.2d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1983) (describing plaintiff's "bad faith letter" to insurer); see
also Note, Liability Insurers, supra note 2, at 132 (describing term "plaintiffs bad faith
letter").
89. See Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, -, 39
Cal. Rptr. 342, 345 (Ct. App. 1964) (plaintiffs have right to place time limits upon their offers
of settlement).
90. See, eg., Kivi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 695 F.2d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 1983)
(insurer's failure to accept plaintiff's offer of settlement within thirty-day time limit constituted
bad faith); Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co., 392 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Or. 1975) (insurer's
failure to accept settlement offer within fifteen-day time limit amounted to bad faith); Phelan
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 104, 448 N.E.2d 579, 584 (App. Ct.
1983) (affirming jury's finding of bad faith after insurer failed to accept plaintiff's offer of
settlement within five-week deadline).
91. See, e.g., Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 907, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1978)
(insurer did not act in bad faith by failing to accept offer of settlement with sudden-death
time limit); DeLaune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(insurer's failure to accept plaintiff's offer of settlement was not in bad faith because offer's
ten-day time limit was totally unreasonable); Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472,
477, 424 N.E.2d 645, 649 (App. Ct. 1981) (plaintiff's time limit on offer of settlement was
unreasonable because plaintiff produced no evidence to show that time limit was necessary
and, therefore, insurer's failure to accept offer breached no duty to insured).
92. See DeLaune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (because ten-day time limit that plaintiff placed on offer of settlement was unreasonable,
insurer's failure to accept plaintiff's offer was reasonable).
93. See Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App- 2d 788, __, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401,
405 (Ct. App. 1964) (good faith or bad faith is question of fact in each case); Martin v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, -, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345 (Ct.
App. 1964) (same).
94. See Coe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 981, 994, 136 Cal.
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Several courts have determined that claims that a third-party has "set
up" an insurer only relate to the question of the insurer's good faith. For
example, in Martin v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,95 the District
Court of Appeal for the State of California considered whether a time limit
that a plaintiff had imposed on a settlement offer bound an insurer. 96 In
Martin, an insurer, after the deadline on a plaintiff's settlement offer had
expired, offered to settle a third-party's claim against an insured within the
insured's policy limits. 97 In considering the plaintiff's complaint, the Martin
court noted that, because the critical issue in a bad faith claim is the
insurer's good faith or bad faith, 9 bad faith claims essentially involve an
issue of ultimate fact.99 The court in Martin recognized that a plaintiff has
a right to place a reasonable time limit upon a settlement offer.100 The
Martin court determined, however, that a time limit which a plaintiff places
on a settlement offer does not necessarily bind insurers.10 The Martin court
noted that an insurer will not be liable if the insurer's refusal to settle is
in good faith 0 2 After considering all the circumstances, the California court
determined that the time limit with which the plaintiff had restricted her
offer of settlement appeared reasonable because the plaintiff made the offer
near the date of trial, a time by which the insurer thoroughly should have
Rptr. 331, 338 (Ct. App. 1977) (whether insurer acted reasonably in failing to accept plaintiff's
offer of settlement within eleven-day deadline was question for jury).
95. 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1964).
96. Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, -, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1964).
97. Id. In Martin v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., the Superior Court of
Monterey County, California had sustained the insurer's demurrer for failure to state facts
sufficient to allege a cause of action. See id. at -, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (discussing superior
court's decision). Following the Superior Court's decision, the plaintiff appealed to the District
Court of Appeal for the State of California. Id. The District Court of Appeal for the State
of California considered whether the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action. Id.
Prior to the insured's trial, the plaintiff in Martin had offered by letter to settle her claim
against the insured within the limits of the insured's insurance policy. Id. at _--- 39 Cal.
Rptr. at 344. After the insurer failed to accept the plaintiff's initial offer, the plaintiff wrote
another letter two months later stating that she would withdraw the offer ten days before the
trial if the insurer did not accept the offer by that time. Id. Seven days before the trial began,
and three days after the plaintiff's deadline had passed, the insurer in Martin offered to pay
the plaintiff the insured's policy limits. Id. The plaintiff refused the insurer's late tender of
the policy limits and, on the opening day of trial, the insurer formally withdrew its offer to
settle the plaintiff's claim. Id. In her complaint in her bad faith action, the plaintiff in Martin
alleged that the insurer knew that the probability of the plaintiff succeeding in the personal
injury action was very high. Id. The plaintiff also alleged that the insurer knew that, if the
plaintiff did succeed, the plaintiff's damages would exceed the insured's policy limit. Id.
98. Id. at __, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
99. Id. at , 39 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 696, 319 P.2d 69, 77
(Ct. App. 1957) (insurer is not liable if its refusal to settle claim against insured was in good
faith).
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investigated the plaintiff's claim. 10 3 The Martin court, therefore, concluded
that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action for bad faith. 1' 4 Even
if an insurer alleges a "set up," therefore, the insurer always must dem-
onstrate that the plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable.
0 5
After Martin, the District Court of Appeal of California, in Critz v.
Farmers Insurance Group,'06 considered whether a one-week time limitation
in a settlement offer precluded a finding of bad faithY' 7 In Critz, a negligent
insured injured the plaintiff in an automobile accident.'0 Five months after
the accident, the plaintiff offered to settle her claim against the insured for
an amount of money equal to the insured's policy limit.1 9 The plaintiff's
settlement offer required that the defendant accept within one week." 0 The
insurer refused to accept the plaintiff's offer and made a lower counterof-
fer."' Citing Martin, the Critz court determined that the plaintiff had a
right to place time limits upon her offer of settlement." 2 Like the court in
Martin, the Critz court examined the reasonableness of the plaintiff's time
limit in terms of the particular facts of the case and ignored evidence that
would have supported a possible "set up.""13 The California court noted
103. Martin, 228 Cal. App. 2d at -, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
104. Id. at __, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
105. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (discussing Martin court's holding
that, although insurer alleged that plaintiff "set up" insurer, ultimate test of insurer's liability
still is overall reasonableness of circumstances).
106. 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 1964), disapproved on other
grounds sub nom. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
107. Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, -, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406
(Ct. App. 1964), disapproved on other grounds sub nom. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.
2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
108. Id. at __, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
109. Id.
110. Id. at ., 41 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
111. Id. In Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, the insured assigned all of her potential
rights against her insurer to the plaintiff. Id. The Superior Court for Sacramento County
determined that the insured's assignment was void. See id. (discussing superior court decision
in Critz). The plaintiff appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the State of California.
Id. The Critz court determined that the insured's potential cause of action for bad faith was
assignable even before the plaintiff had secured an excess judgment against the insured. Id. at
__ 41 Cal. Rptr. at 404. The Critz court, therefore, concluded that the assignment to the
plaintiff was valid. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The plaintiff's attorney in Critz procured a document that the insured had signed.
Id. at -, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 403. In the document, the insured had specified that the insurer
unreasonably refused the plaintiff's offer of settlement and had exposed the insured to potential
excess liability. Id. Additionally, the document assigned to the plaintiff any right that the
insured had against the insurer. Id. The Critz court noted that the insured and the plaintiff
accomplished these arrangements before the plaintiff instituted the personal injury suit against
the insured. Id. The insurer did not discover that the insured had assigned her rights to a bad
faith claim to the plaintiff until several months after the insured's assignment. Id. When the
insurer in Critz discovered the assignment, the insurer offered to tender the amount of the
policy limits to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff, however, refused the insurer's offer shortly
before trial. Id. The court nonetheless found that the insurer acted in bad faith. Id. The short
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that the insurer's investigation of the claim against the insured was com-
plete." 4 The Critz court determined that, because the insurer's investigation
was complete, the plaintiff could regard the insurer's counteroffer as an
invitation to litigate." 5 Accordingly, the Critz court concluded that a one-
week time limit on the settlement offer did not preclude a finding of bad
faith. "6 Decisions like Martin and Critz reveal that courts use a totality of
the circumstances analysis in bad faith claims, and that courts ordinarily
are unwilling to dismiss bad faith actions before both parties offer their
own versions of the facts." 7 Evidence of a "set up" attempt only is useful
to insurers insofar as the attempt demonstrates the plaintiff's unreasonable-
ness and, conversely, the insurer's reasonableness in failing to accept a
settlement offer. "
8
Although the courts in Martin and Critz were willing to accept a
plaintiff's contention that evidence of an insurer's bad faith existed, at least
one court has looked beyond conclusory allegations of bad faith in a
complaint and required plaintiffs to justify reasons for imposing time limits.
In Adduci v. Vigilant Insurance Co., 9 the Appellate Court for the State
of Illinois considered whether an insurer's offer to pay the policy limits
after the plaintiffs' settlement offer had expired could preclude a finding
of bad faith.12 0 The plaintiffs in Adduci made a settlement demand to the
defendant which provided that the plaintiffs would withdraw their offer if
the insurer did not tender an amount equal to the policy limits within
twenty-eight days.' 2' The insurer, however, did not offer to pay the policy
time limit that the plaintiff in Critz placed upon the offer of settlement, coupled with the
content and timing of the assignment document, indicated a "set up" attempt by the plaintiff's
attorney.
114. Id. Like the court in Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., the court in Critz
carefully noted that, at the time that the plaintiff offered to settle, the insurer knew that the
court almost certainly would find the insurer liable. Id. at -, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
Additionally, the Critz court noted that the insurer, although denying the plaintiff's offer of
settlement, knew that the plaintiff's damages were likely to exceed the insured's policy limit.
Id.; see Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, -, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 344 (Ct. App. 1964) (plaintiff alleged that insurer knew that probability of plaintiff's
success was high and that plaintiff's damages probably would exceed insured's policy limit).
115. Critz, 230 Cal. App. 2d at -, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
116. Id. at __ , 41 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
117. See id. at __ , 41 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (good faith or bad faith is question of fact in
each case); Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, -, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 345 (Ct. App. 1964) (plaintiff's allegation of bad faith is essentially one of ultimate
fact).
118. See DeLaune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (insurer's failure to accept plaintiff's offer of settlement was not in bad faith because
offer's ten-day time limit was totally unreasonable).
119. 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 424 N.E.2d 645 (App. Ct. 1981).
120. Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 475, 424 N.E.2d 645, 647 (App.
Ct. 1981). In Adduci v. Vigilant Insurance Co., the trial court granted the insurer's motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 473, 424 N.E.2d at 646. The plaintiffs appealed to
the Appellate Court for the State of Illinois. Id.
121. Id. at 477, 424 N.E.2d at 647.
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limit until forty-four days after the deadlineY2 The plaintiffs claimed that,
because the insurer in Adduci had not responded to the plaintiffs' demand
within the time limit, the insurer acted in bad faith.'23 The Adduci court,
unlike the courts in Martin and Critz, refused to deem the time limit that
the plaintiffs placed upon their settlement offer as reasonable, even though,
as in Martin and Critz, the insurer apparently knew that liability was certain
and that damages exceeded the policy limits.12 The court in Adduci placed
on the plaintiffs the burden of showing reasons that the plaintiffs could
not accept the insurer's tender of the policy limits after the settlement offer
had expired.' 25 Even though the plaintiffs offered a reason for refusing the
late offer, '2 the Illinois court determined that no facts existed which would
indicate reasons that the plaintiffs could not accept the late tender of the
policy limits.127 The Adduci court, therefore, concluded that the insurer's
conduct was reasonable as a matter of law.
1 28
Although the Adduci decision appears directly to contrast with the
holdings in Martin and Critz, 29 the Appellate Court for the State of Illinois,
in Phelan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,130 determined
that Adduci did not change the rule that the Martin court established. The
Phelan court considered whether the Adduci decision precluded a finding
of bad faith on the part of the insurer if the insurer had made a dilatory
offer of the policy limit.' The plaintiff in Phelan made both a verbal and
a written offer to settle his claim within the insured's policy limit.3 2 Rather
than accept the plaintiff's settlement offer, the insurer in Phelan made a
122. Id. In Adduci, the settlement demand, in addition to allowing the insurer twenty-
eight days to accept the plaintiffs offer, provided for the possibility of a written extension
based upon reasonable grounds. Id.
123. Id. After the jury in Adduci rendered an excess judgment for the plaintiffs, the
insured assigned her cause of action against the insurer to the plaintiffs. Id.
124. Id. at 478, 424 N.E.2d at 648.
125. Id. at 477, 424 N.E.2d at 647.
126. Id. The plaintiffs in Adduci alleged that they failed to accept the insurer's late offer
of the policy limits because they had to undertake further preparation for trial. Id. Since the
additional preparation was more costly, alleged the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs had to negotiate
a different fee arrangement with their counsel. Id. The plaintiffs in Adduci claimed that the
new fee arrangement made the insurer's late offer of the insured's policy limits inadequate.
Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 477, 424 N.E.2d at 650. The Adduci court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the plaintiffs' complaint. Id.
129. See Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, -, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401,
403 (insurer offered to settle case for insured's policy limits after insurer learned of insured's
assignment of insured's cause of action against insurer to plaintiff); Martin v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, -, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (insurer offered
to settle for insured's policy limits after plaintiff's offer of settlement expired).
130. 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 448 N.E.2d 579 (App. Ct. 1983).
131. Phelan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 103, 448 N.E.2d
579, 581 (App. Ct. 1983).
132. Id. at 98, 448 N.E.2d at 580.
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counteroffer.' 33 Over a month later, the insurer offered the policy limit,
which the plaintiff refused.' 34 The insurer in Phelan argued that the plain-
tiff's refusal to accept the policy limits one month after the plaintiff's
deadline had expired was unreasonable. 13 In distinguishing Adduci, the
Phelan court recognized that, in Adduci, no factual evidence demonstrated
that the plaintiffs could not accept the insurer's late offer, but that, in the
present case, ample evidence existed concerning the necessity of a time
limit.' 36 The Phelan court concluded that Adduci did not require that any
settlement offer forty days after the time limit expired preclude a finding
of bad faith by the insurer, but, instead, involved the allegation of insuf-
ficient facts.'3 7 While the Phelan court's analysis appears technically sound,
the Phelan court actually accepted the same reason for the plaintiff's
imposition of a time limit that the Adduci court rejected.' 38 The only
difference between the two cases was that the plaintiff in Phelan had an
opportunity to present and develop evidence at trial in support of her
reason, while the plaintiffs in Adduci lost on motion to dismiss.'3 9 This
apparent inconsistency amplifies the fact-bound nature of bad faith claims.
Although the Phelan court seemed to ignore possible efforts to "set
up" insurers, explicit judicial awareness of "set up" attempts does exist.
For example, in Grumbling v. Medallion Insurance Co.,1'4 the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon considered whether an insurer had
a duty to use telecommunications to accept an offer of settlement with a
fifteen-day time limit.' 4' In Grumbling the plaintiff made an offer to settle
133. Id.
134. Id. In Phelan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the plaintiff's letter
demanding settlement contained a time limit of approximately five weeks, and the plaintiff
subsequently extended the time limit an additional five days. Id. After the jury in Phelan
rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in excess of the insured's policy limit, the trial court
granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the insurer and granted the insurer a new
trial. Id. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court for the State of Illinois. Id.
135. Id. at 99, 448 N.E.2d at 583.
136. Id. In Phelan, the plaintiff produced evidence at trial which demonstrated that the
plaintiff's attorney had to secure the services of a trial specialist to try the case and that the
plaintiff had incurred other expenses in preparation for trial which justified the plaintiff's
refusal to accept the insurer's counteroffer. Id. Moreover, a jury had found that the insurer
in Phelan had breached its duty to its insured. Id. at 100, 448 N.E.2d at 583.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (plaintiffs in Adduci alleged that failure
to accept insurer's late offer of settlement was because plaintiff incurred increased expenses
in preparation for trial); supra note 136 and accompanying text (plaintiff's evidence at trial in
Phelan showed increased expenses because of preparation for trial).
139. Compare Phelan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 104, 448
N.E.2d 579, 584 (App. Ct. 1983) (plaintiff's evidence at trial demonstrated necessity of incurring
additional expenses) with Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 477, 424 N.E.2d
645, 649 (App. Ct. 1981) (plaintiffs' allegations of necessity of incurring additional expenses
were insufficient as matter of law).
140. 392 F. Supp. 717 (D. Or. 1975).
141. Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co., 392 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Or. 1975).
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within the insured's policy limits that would remain open for fifteen days. 142
Because the insurer's company procedures did not allow the insurer to
accept the offer by telephone, however, the insurer failed to accept the
plaintiff's offer within the time limit. 143 The Grumbling court determined
that the insurer had known that the liability of the insured was certain and
knew that damages greatly exceeded the policy limits. 44 The district court
determined that the sole reason for the insurer's failure to accept the
plaintiff's offer before the offer had expired was because of the insurer's
failure to use the telephone. 45 Under the circumstances, the court in
Grumbling held that the insurer's failure to use the telephone constituted
bad faith.'" In dicta, however, the Grumbling court added that the court
would not allow a plaintiff's attorney to "set up" an insurer for an excess
judgment by making an offer of settlement with an unreasonable time
limit.147 The Grumbling court recognized the validity and necessity of offers
that contained time limits, especially of offers that plaintiffs made near to
or in the middle of trial. 4 The district court noted, however, that, if the
offer expired before the insurer's investigation of the claim was complete,
the plaintiff would not necessarily prevail. 49 The court concluded that
whether a time limit is reasonable depends upon the sequence of events
leading to the settlement offer, the stage of the proceedings at which a
plaintiff makes a settlement offer, and all the other circumstances surround-
ing the offer.
50
Decisions like Grumbling demonstrate that the "set up" defense basi-
cally is an effort by an insurer to establish that the insurer, acting in good
faith, was unable to accept an offer that contained an unreasonable time
limit.15' The success of such a "defense" normally hinges on the totality of
the circumstances'5 2 and the timing of the insurer's argument. 5 3 As a result,
142. Id. at 719.
143. Id. In Grumbling, the insurer's company procedures provided exclusively for written
acceptance of settlement offers. Id. Subsequently, the insurer, although making a late offer
to tender the insured's policy limits, offered to pay an amount in excess of the insured's policy
limits. Id. The plaintiff in Grumbling rejected the insurer's offer and recovered an excess
judgment at trial. Id.







151. See id. (insurer claimed that plaintiff's fifteen-day time limit was unreasonable); see
also Kriz v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 42 Or. App. 339, -, 600 P.2d 496, 500 (Ct.
App. 1979) (insurer argued that plaintiff's demand letter was "carefully ambiguous," and that
offer contained sudden death timetable that plaintiff unreasonably designed to set up insurer
for bad faith claim).
152. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (listing decisions emphasizing that bad
faith claims depend on reasonableness of circumstances).
153. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (question of insurer's bad faith ordinarily
is question for jury).
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the "set up" defense is probably of limited value to insurers. 54 At least
one commentator has suggested that, because evidence of a "set up" is
prima facie evidence of the insurer's good faith and the plaintiff's unrea-
sonableness, courts closely should examine cases in which an allegation or
evidence of such conduct occurs.' 55 Even if courts more carefully scrutinize
cases in which evidence of a "set up" exists, however, courts still will look
only at the overall factors that determine whether the conduct in issue was
"reasonable."' '5 6 If a claimant's attempt to "set up" an insurer made an
insurer's failure to settle reasonable, the insurer will prevail. 57 If, however,
a claimant's attempt to hold an insurer liable for the excess judgment did
not contribute to an insurer's failure to settle, a claimant may recover. 5 8
A court's evaluation of a bad faith claim, therefore, remains exactly the
same as if the insurer made no allegation of "set up.' ' 59 The "set up"
defense's potential as an absolute defense to a bad faith claim is negligible.'6
Even if a court feels that an insurer exercised good faith as a matter of
law, the "set up" defense operates only as one piece of evidence that a
court examines in making its determination regarding the insurer's good
faith.' 6' Moreover, a court's finding that an insurer's conduct constitutes
good faith or bad faith as a matter of law is a relatively unusual finding
154. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing McNally court's holding that
nothing in public policy or existing law requires a court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint because
plaintiff's counsel intended to "set up" insurer).
155. See P. MAGARICK, supra note 5, § 11.06[1], at 103 (courts, in considering bad faith
claims, should determine whether any reasonable cause for plaintiff's time limit existed, and
whether insurer's failure to accept offer before time limit expired prejudiced insured in any
way).
156. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (listing factors that courts often use to
determine whether insurers' conduct was reasonable).
157. See, e.g., Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 907, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1978)
(insurer did not act in bad faith by failing to accept settlement offer with sudden-death time
limit); DeLaune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(insurer's failure to accept plaintiff's settlement offer was not in bad faith because offer's ten-
day time limit was totally unreasonable); Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472,
477, 424 N.E.2d 645, 649 (App. Ct. 1981) (plaintiff's time limit on settlement offer was
unreasonable because plaintiff produced no evidence to show that time limit was necessary
and, therefore, insurer's failure to accept offer breached no duty to insured).
158. See, e.g., Kivi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 695 F.2d 1285, 1288 (lth Cir. 1983)
(insurer's failure to accept plaintiff's settlement offer within thirty-day time limit constituted
bad faith); Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co., 392 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Or. 1975) (insurer's
failure to accept settlement offer with fifteen-day time limit amounted to bad faith); Phelan
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ili. Apo. 3d 96, 106, 448 N.E.2d 579, 584 (App. Ct.
1983) (affirming jury's finding of bad faith after insurer failed to accept plaintiff's offer of
settlement within five-week deadline).
159. See McNally v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 83-865-WKS, mem. op. at 3 (D. Del. Feb.
15, 1985) (no principle of law requires court to dismiss bad faith claim simply because
plaintiff's attorney intended to "set up" insurer for bad faith action), aff'd on other grounds,
815 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1987).
160. See id. (denying "set up" allegation as affirmative defense).
161. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (listing decisions which emphasize that bad
faith claims depend on reasonableness of circumstances).
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that probably is not affected by an allegation that the insurer was "set
up.,
162
B. The Comparative Fault Defense
Although the "set up" defense ,offers insurers only limited assistance
in defending bad faith claims, courts recently have begun to allow insurers
to claim comparative fault as a defense to bad faith actions. 63 Unlike the
"set up" defense, the recent recognition of the comparative fault defense
conceivably may prove of importance to insurers. 64 Comparative negligence
has evolved from the basic principle that a party may not recover for
injuring himself. 65 The comparative fault defense allows courts to reduce
the amount that insurers must pay to an insured by an amount proportional
to the relative fault of the plaintiff.'6 For example, in California Casualty
162. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (courts rarely hold that insurer conduct is
reasonable or unreasonable as matter of law).
163. See California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274,
283, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (Ct. App. 1985) (comparative fault can constitute at least partial
defense to bad faith claim); see generally Houser, Ashworth, & Francis, Comparative Bad
Faith: The Two Way Street Opens For Travel, 23 IDAHo L. REv. 367, 367-77 (1986-87)
(discussing impact of recent recognition of comparative fault); Wood, Comparative Fault as a
Partial Defense to Actions for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, 53 INs. CouNs. J. 566, 566-72 (Oct. 1986) (same). The reciprocal duty of good faith
incumbent upon insureds could afford insurers a cause of action against insureds for insureds'
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Dobbyn, supra note 3, at 355-79
(discussing whether courts should afford insurers reciprocal bad faith cause of action).
164. See California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274,
283, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (Ct. App. 1985) (comparative fault can constitute at least partial
defense to bad faith claim).
165. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, -, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 937 (1809) (one
person's fault will not dispense with another person's duty to use ordinary care to protect
himself).
166. See Fleming v. Safeco Ins. Co., 160 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36, 206 Cal. Rptr. 313, 316
(Ct. App. 1984) (reducing plaintiff's compensatory damages in amount proportional to plain-
tiff's fault); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Micr. L. REv. 465, 465 n.2 (1953) (com-
parative negligence statutes and rules provide method for division of damages between parties).
Over one-half of the jurisdictions in the United States have adopted comparative negligence
principles as a defense to tort claims. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TIE LAw OF TORTS §
67, at 471 (5th ed. 1984) (listing jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence
principles). Different states, however, have adopted comparative negligence in different forms.
See id.; 3 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A GANS, THE AmEwcAN LAW OF TORTS § 13.3, at 693-
703 (1986) (discussing evolution of comparative negligence doctrine). Some states apply pure
comparative negligence standards to tort claims so that a plaintiff who is ninety-nine percent
at fault still can recover one percent of his damages. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 827, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232 (1975) (adopting pure comparative
negligence in California); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Il1. 2d 1, 28, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896-98 (1981)
(abolishing doctrine of contributory negligence and adopting pure comparative negligence in
Illinois); Lamborn v. Phillips Pac. Chem. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 701, -, 575 P.2d 215, 221
(1978) (affirming damage award that represented one percent of plaintiff's actual damages).
Other jurisdictions, however, allow a plaintiff to recover only if his negligence was less than
the negligence of the defendant. See, e.g., Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 491,
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General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 67 the Court of Appeal for the
State of California considered whether an insurer could assert comparative
fault as an affirmative defense to a bad faith claim. 68 The plaintiff in
California Casualty claimed that an insurer, in bad faith, refused to pay
the plaintiff for damages that the plaintiff had received in an automobile
accident. 69 The plaintiff alleged that, because of the insurer's bad faith
failure to pay the plaintiff's claim, the court should award the plaintiff
both compensatory and punitive damages. 70 The insurer in California
Casualty argued that the plaintiff was partially responsible for his damages
and that the court, using comparative negligence principles, should reduce
the plaintiff's damages proportionally.17 ' The California Casualty court
recognized that no court previously had recognized the validity of the
comparative fault defense to a bad faith claim. 7 2 In assessing the compar-
49 S.E.2d 90, 108 (Ct. App. 1948) (if plaintiff's negligence equals or exceeds defendant's
negligence, plaintiff cannot recover), disapproved on other grounds sub nom. Grayson v.
Yarbrough, 103 Ga. App. 243, 119 S.E.2d 41 (Ct. App. 1961); Forsythe v. Coats Co., 230
Kan. 553, -, 639 P.2d 43, 46 (1982) (in Kansas plaintiffs can recover if plaintiffs' own
negligence contributed forty-nine percent or less to plaintiffs' damages); Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 342, 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1979) (plaintiff can recover in tort if
plaintiff's negligence does not equal or exceed negligence of other parties). Still other states
permit courts to apply the comparative fault doctrine only if a plaintiff's fault was not greater
than a defendant's fault. See Acampora v. Asselin, 179 Conn. 425, __, 426.A.2d 797, 798
(1980) (plaintiff's negligence does not bar plaintiff's recovery if plaintiff's negligence was not
greater than defendant's negligence); Leyva v. Smith, 557 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (plaintiff may recover in tort if plaintiff's negligence was not greater than defendant's
negligence). Finally, two states allow plaintiffs to recover under comparative negligence if a
plaintiff's negligence was "slight" and a defendant's negligence was "gross." See Bezdek v.
Patrick, 167 Neb. 754, -, 94 N.W.2d 482, 489 (1959) (to define "slight" and "gross" in
state comparative fault statute, court must compare relative degree of parties' negligence);
First Northwestern Trust Co. v. Schnable, 334 N.W.2d 16, 19-20 (S.D. 1983) (affirming
judgment for defendant because plaintiff's negligence was more than "slight"). Because
jurisdictions apply different comparative fault standards to bad faith claims, insurers' potential
use of comparative fault as a defense to bad faith claims may depend upon highly technical
rules of law. In states that have adopted no form of comparative fault, however, the
comparative fault defense is not available to insurers at all. See W. SHEPN O , S. GAGE & H.
LEvINE, INsuRAcE BAD FAm LITIGATmON § 4.06, at 4-27 (1986) (in states in which contributory
negligence is total bar to recovery, comparative negligence defense is unavailable).
167. 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985).
168. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 274,
218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 817 (Ct. App. 1985).
169. Id. at 276, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818. In California Casualty General Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court, the plaintiff first took her bad faith claim to arbitration and received a
favorable award. Id.
170. Id. After the insurer in California Casualty answered the plaintiff's complaint, the
insurer moved for leave to amend its answer to assert the defense of comparative fault. Id.
at 277, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818-819. The plaintiff opposed the insurer's motion to amend, and
the trial court denied-the motion. Id. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal for the State of
California granted the insurer an alternative writ of mandate and agreed to consider whether
the denial of the insurer's motion to amend was proper. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 278, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
BAD FAITH CLAIMS
ative 'fault defense, however, the California Casualty court noted that
misconduct by the plaintiff would be admissible to show the insurer's
reasonableness in failing to settle and to calculate the plaintfffs damages.
73
The California Casualty court decided that juries should consider evidence
of the plaintiff's bad faith by using comparative negligence principles, rather
than in some unknown and unguided manner 74 The California Casualty
court concluded that, because the duty of good faith and fair dealing applies
both to the insured and to the insurer, a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing by the insured could constitute at least a partial defense
to the insured's bad faith claim against the insurer.'ms
In determining-that an insured's breach of duty can constitute a partial
defense for the insurer, the California Casualty court recognized that the
foundation of the comparative fault defense is the reciprocal duty of good
faith that the insured owes the insurer. 7 6 Comparative fault is similar to
other defenses that depend upon the insured's misconduct to mitigate the
insurer's failure to pay a claim_177 Unlike other defenses that depend upon
the insured's misconduct, however, the comparative fatilt defense is primarily
a partial defense. 178 While other defenses that depend upon the insured's
173. Id. at 279,, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see Wood, supra note 163, at 577 (comparative fault defense depends upon
degree to which insured fulfilled his duty of good faitli and fair dealing).
177. See supra note 68 (discussing defenses to bad faith claims).
178. See California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274,
278, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1985) (insurer requested court to give jury instruction
that, if jury found plaintiff partially at fault, jury should reduce plaintiff's damages by amount
proportional to plaintiff's fault). Although the California Casualty court discussed comparative
fault only as a partial defense, comparative fault may have the potential to operate as an
absolute defense to a bad faith claim. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (if both parties breach implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing, neither party can recover for other party's breach), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 92 (1987). In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v, National Football
League, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether, if both
parties to a contract breach their contractual duties of good faith, and fair dealing, the doctrine
of comparative fault could operate as a partial or absolute defense for a defendant in an
action for breach of the duty. Id. at 1361. In Los Angeles Memorial, the Los Angeles Coliseum
Commission and the Oakland Raiders football team brought an antitrust action against the
National Football League for, among other things, the League's breach of its contractual duty
of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 1359. The Ninth Circuit determined that, if neither the
team nor the League had breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the team could
not recover damages. Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that no precedent existed concerning
whether a plaintiff's breach of duty could constitute a defense to a plaintiff's suit'against a
defendant for its breach of duty. Id The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to recognize that, in
California Casualty, the Court of Appeals for the State of California had determined that a
plaintiff's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing could, constitute at least a partial
defense to a plaintiff's action for a defendant's breach of duty. Compare Los Angeles Memorial,
791 F.2d at 1362 (no California court has considered case in which both parties to contract
breached their duties of good faith and fair dealing) with California Casualty, 173 Cal. App.
3d at 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (comparative fault of plaintiff can, constitute at least partial
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misconduct either entirely preclude the insured's recovery if the insurer
successfully pleads its defense or allow the insured full recovery if the
insurer's defense fails, the comparative fault defense can reduce the insured's
damages by from one to ninety-nine percent. 7 9 The comparative fault
defense, therefore, is markedly different from the "set up" defense.8 0 While
the "set up" defense involves one piece of evidence in an insurer's attempt
to demonstrate that it acted reasonably, comparative fault involves an
equitable reduction in damages in an amount proportional to the degree of
the plaintiff's fault.' 8' A claim that an insurer was "set up" will be successful
only if evidence helps entirely to negate charges of bad faith against an
insurer because a jury ordinarily has no method for apportioning relative
fault. 182 A comparative fault defense, however, will assist an insurer who
clearly acted in bad faith by reducing the damages that the insurer will have
to pay.
18 3
Although the comparative fault defense may be more beneficial to
insurers than the "set up" defense, the comparative fault defense cannot
assist in solving all insurers' difficulties under bad faith claims. The use of
comparative fault creates a problem if a plaintiff claims punitive damages
from the insurer because of the different standard of conduct necessary for
the imposition of punitive damages. 8 4 In Fleming v. Safeco Insurance Co.,s185
defense to bad faith claim). The Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Memorial adopted a rule under
which mutual breaches of the duty of good faith and fair dealing during the "same episode
or transaction of the relationship" counteract each other. Los Angeles Memorial, 791 F.2d at
1356. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, if both parties to the contract breached the implied
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, then neither party could recover. Id. at 1362.
Although Los Angeles Memorial failed to recognize existing California precedent concerning
mutual breaches of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the decision raises the possibility
that courts could allow an insured's breach of duty to constitute an absolute defense to a bad
faith claim. See id. (mutual breaches of duty of good faith and fair dealing extinguish each
other so that neither party can recover for the other party's breach of duty).
179. See Lamborn v. Phillips Pac. Chem. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 701, 710, 575 P.2d 215, 221
(1978) (affirming damage award that represented one percent of plaintiff's actual damages);
supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing various methods of adopting comparative
negligence).
180. Compare supra notes 71-162 and accompanying text (discussing "set up" defense)
with supra notes 163-93 and accompanying text (discussing comparative fault defense).
181. See 3 S. SPEISER, C. KausE, & A. GAs, supra note 166, § 13:1, at 687 (comparative
negligence allows courts to apportion responsibility in relation to relative fault of parties).
182. See id., § 13:2, at 691 (comparative fault allows juries to accomplish apportionment
of damages between parties).
183. Compare DeLaune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (insurer's failure to accept plaintiff's settlement offer was not in bad faith because
offer's ten-day time limit was totally unreasonable) with Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co.,
392 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Or. 1975) (insurer's failure to accept settlement offer with fifteen-
day time limit amounted to bad faith).
184. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110,
113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974) (defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice
before court can impose punitive damages).
185. 160 Cal. App. 3d 31, 206 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Ct. App. 1984).
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the Court of Appeals for the State of California questioned whether a
court, in considering a bad faith action, could reduce a punitive damage
award against an insurer because of an insured's comparative misconduct.
8 6
The insurer in Fleming offered to settle the insured plaintiff's claim for less
than the insured's policy limits, but the plaintiff refused. 187 In considering
the plaintiff's bad faith claim, the trial court reduced the plaintiff's com-
pensatory damages by twenty-six percent, but did not reduce the award of
punitive damages. 8 8 The Fleming court recognized that, in California, no
precedent for a comparative reduction of punitive damages in a bad faith
claim existed.'8 9 The Fleming-court reasoned that comparing a plaintiff's
bad faith with a defendant's malice, oppression, or fraud was impossible
because the standards of conduct in issue were completely different. 9°
Additionally, the California court recognized that, because the insurer did
not raise the issue of comparative negligence with respect to punitive
damages at trial, the insurer could not raise the issue on appeal. 191 Numerous
courts have supported the Fleming court's refusal to use comparative
negligence principles to reduce an award of punitive damages. 92 If both the
186. See Fleming v. Safeco Ins. Co., 160 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36, 206 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315
(Ct. App. 1984). In Fleming v. Safeco Insurance Co., an uninsured motorist injured the
insured, an occurrence that the insured's insurance policy with the defendant insurer covered.
Id. The Fleming case, like the California Casualty case, involved an insurer who owed an
insured directly under the terms of the insured's policy. See Fleming, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 36,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (insurer refused to pay claim under terms of insurance contract with
plaintiff); California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 277,
218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 818 (Ct. App. 1985) (same).
187. Fleming, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 36, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 315. In Fleming, an arbitration
award to the plaintiff of the insured's full policy limits about one and one-half years after
the plaintiff's accident eventually settled plaintiff's claim with the insurer. Id. Subsequently,
the plaintiff sued the insurer, alleging that the insurer owed her compensatory and punitive
damages because of the insurer's bad faith in refusing to settle her claim. Id.
188. Id. The jury in Fleming had determined that the insurer's bad faith accounted for
seventy-four percent of the plaintiff's damages and that the plaintiff's own bad faith resulted
in twenty-six percent of the plaintiff's damages. Id. at 36-37, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
189. Id. at 42, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
190. Id. The Fleming court assumed the existence of malice, fraud, or oppression by the
insurer because, under California law, the existence of at least one of these elements is a
prerequisite to an award of punitive damages. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal.
3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974) (defendant must be guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice before court can impose punitive damages); Fleming, 160 Cal.
App. 3d at 44, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (same).
191. Fleming, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 44, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 320. The Fleming court did not
disturb the comparative reduction of plaintiff's compensatory damages. Id. The Fleming court,
however, did not recognize expressly the unique concept of comparative fault because the
insurer, on appeal, did not contest the award of compensatory damages. Id. at 45, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 321. Nevertheless, the Fleming decision laid the groundwork for recognizing the
comparative fault defense. See California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal.
App. 3d 274, 281 n.2, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821 n.2 (Ct. App. 1985) (although noting that
Fleming decision did not constitute judicial recognition of comparative fault defense, court
approved comparative fault as defense to bad faith claims).
192. See, e.g., Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 653, 658-59
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plaintiff and the insurer engaged in conduct that would support a punitive
damages award, however, no apparent reason exists for a court to disallow
insurers from claiming the comparative fault defense.' 93 In situations in
which punitive damages are not at issue, the comparative fault defense
greatly assists insurers in defending themselves from growing numbers of
bad faith claims.
III. CONCLUSION
By allowing insurers to use the comparative fault defense against claims
of bad faith, courts have recognized that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing applies equally to the insurer and the insured, and exemplifies the
equitable principle that a plaintiff should not recover for self-inflicted
harm.'9 By apportioning the fault between insurer and insured, courts can
effect a partial or complete reduction of a plaintiff's damages and can
protect insurers from paying damages to parties who partly are to blame
for their own injuries.' 95 Unlike the comparative fault defense, the "set up"
defense does not appear significantly to assist insurers in defending bad
faith claims.' 96 Because, under the "set up" defense, evidence that a plaintiff
"set up" an insurer shows the plaintiff acted unreasonably, the "set up"
defense actually does not constitute a real defense, but merely shows that
the insurer acted reasonably and in good faith.' 97 Both the comparative
fault and the "set up" defenses, however, offer insurers assistance in
defending against increasing plaintiffs' claims.' 98 The evolution of bad faith
claims against insurers reveals a decided trend toward protecting insureds.'1
(Mont. 1981) (award of punitive damages bears no reasonable relationship to plaintiffs'
conduct); Anderson v. Trent, 685 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (use of comparative
negligence statute to reduce exemplary damages is inappropriate because imposition of punitive
damages requires gross negligence, which is different from ordinary negligence and not subject
to comparison); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, -, 294 N.W.2d 437, 446
n.7 (1980) (comparative negligence is not applicable to punitive damages because purpose of
punitive damages is punishment and deterrence of wanton, willful, or reckless misconduct).
193. See Wood, supra note 163, at 571 (Fleming court could have reduced punitive
damages if jury had compared fault on punitive damages and jury had found malice, fraud,
or oppression by plaintiff).
194. See California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274,
279, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (Ct. App. 1985) (duty of good faith and fair dealing applies
equally to insurer and insured); Fleming v. Safeco Ins. Co., 160 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36, 206
Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (Ct. App. 1984) (same).
195. See California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (insurer
requested court to give jury instruction that, if jury found plaintiff partially at fault, jury
should reduce plaintiff's damages by amount proportional to plaintiff's fault).
196. See supra notes 71-162 and accompanying text (discussing "set up" defense).
197. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (under "set up" defense, courts still will
look only at overall factors that determine whether insurer's conduct was reasonable).
198. See supra notes 71-162 and accompanying text (discussing "set up" defense); supra
notes 163-93 and accompanying text (discussing comparative fault defense).
199. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text (discussing trend toward strict liability);
Note, Excess Liability, supra note 2, at 396 (large recoveries for bad faith have become
commonplace).
BAD FAITH CLAIMS
Insurers naturally are receptive to methods for blunting this increasing
liability, and thoroughly should examine new and unique issues in bad faith
claims. 200 By allowing insurers to utilize the "set up" defense and particularly
the comparative fault defense, courts will hold insurers responsible for
damages that the insurers proximately cause and will not allow plaintiffs to
recover for the plaintiffs' own misconduct. 201 More importantly, courts,
although compensating individuals that suffer needlessly, still will allow the




200. See Ashley, supra note 61, at 103 (insurers should invest time, thought, and money
to bring their claims handling procedures into compliance with court directives).
201. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (comparative fault defense apportions
damages according to relative fault of insurer and insured).
202. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (increasing insurers' liability under bad
faith claims probably would cause consumers' insurance premiums to rise).
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